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Corporate Governance in a Global
Environment: The Search for the Best
of All Worlds
Timothy L. Fort'*
Cindy A. Schipani***
ABSTRACT

This Article reflects on the various visions of corporate
governance. Initially, the Article reviews the contractarian
The
and communitarian theories of the corporation.
communitarian theory views the corporation as a separate
entity, with social responsibilities not only to the
shareholdersbut to the firm's other stakeholders and society
at large. On the other hand, the contractarianapproach
considers the firm's shareholders as the primary
constituency to whom management is accountable.
Voluntary contractingand marketforces align the interests of
management and shareholders.
The Article next analyzes salient features of corporate
governance in the United States, Japan, and Germany. The
United States provides an example of a country heavily
rooted in a contractarian, shareholder-primacy approach,
whereas Japan and Germany traditionallyhave appeared to
be more aligned with communitarian ideals. Recent events
suggest that these traditionaldistinctions are changing, with
the resulting entities suggesting a convergence between the
two models.
The Authors propose a model that examines business as
a mediating institution-that is, as corporate communities
that compete in a marketplace as well as support the moral
dispositionsof their employees and shareholders. The result
of this model is an entity that provides the freedom and
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flexibility of a contractarianmodel while also being attentive
to communitariansentiments.
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The point is that capitalism, albeit on another level and not in such trivial
forms, is struggling with the same problems [as communism] .... [Ijt is wellknown, for instance, that enormous private multinational corporations are
curiously like socialist states; with industrialization, centralization,
specialization, monopolization, and finally with automation and
computerization, the elements of depersonalizationand the loss of meaning
IBM certainly
in work become more and more profound everywhere ....
works better than the Skoda plant, but that doesn't alter the fact that both
companies have long since lost their human dimension and have turned man
into a little cog in their machinery, utterly separatedfrom what, and for
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whom, that machinery is working, and what the impact of its product is on
1
the world.

Capitalism has an enviable record of creating wealth,
No other economic
opportunity, and technological advances.
standard of
equivalent
an
produced
has
history
human
in
system
living. Yet apart from the important issues that environmental2
ists have raised and that the passion of protests in Seattle and
3
Davos has shown, there is an unease associated with capitalism,
an unease captured by Vaclev Havel, the President of the Czech
Republic, in the opening quote. On the one hand, to compare the
dreariness of an Eastern European plant with the clean efficiency
of a U.S. technology firm, even one as large as IBM, is absurd.
On the other hand, Havel expresses unease about human beings
losing a sense of their personhood in the midst of a centralized,
controlling, corporate megastructure. Although people in free
market capitalism undoubtedly have vastly superior freedom to
choose what companies they work for, the logic of efficiency and
bureaucracy requires them to adopt roles that can change
persons into cogs.
This problem has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, it is a central
Communitarians worry that
concern of "communitarianism."
human beings lose a sense of their social identity in free market
economics, a free market where a contractarian approach to
business relationships dominates. 4 As a result, a substantial
portion of the twentieth century featured debates among
American corporate theorists as to whether a corporation should
be considered a natural entity with responsibilities for its
stakeholders or a web resulting from a nexus of contracts among

VACLAV HAVEL, DISTURBING THE PEACE: A CONVERSATION WITH KAREL
1.
HV12DALA 14 (Paul Wilson trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1990) (1986).
For a discussion of the widespread protests in Seattle in 1999 in
2.
opposition to the World Trade Organization, see The Battle in Seattle, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 27, 1999, at 21; Michael Elliott, The New Radicals, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13,
1999, at 36; Lynda Gorov, The Varied Foes of WTO Unite in Seattle Protests,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1999, at Al; David Postman, Resistance Takes Fast
Track-Protesters Training Now For Sit-ins, Blockades, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 10,
1999, at Al.
For a discussion of the recent protest against global trading systems in
3.
response to the World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland, see David
Greising, Shades of Seattle Riot as Clinton Addresses Elite Economic Forum, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 30, 2000, at C13; Jane Perlez, At Trade Forum, Clinton Pleadsfor the
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at A8.
See generally AMITAI ETzIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND
4.
See also Antonin Wagner,
MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1996).
Communitarianisrm"A New Paradigmof Socioeconomic Analysis, 24 J. Socio-ECON.
593, 598 (1995); The Politics of Restoration, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1994-Jan. 6,
1995, at 33.
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self-interested individuals who measure the success of the firm
through profitability.5 In addition, the meaning of the purpose of
the firm is a question raised in comparative literature, where
Japan and Germany are seen as emblematic of countries with
communitarian corporate governance structures, in contrast to
the United Kingdom, which feature
the United States and
6
contractarian models.
This Article explores the divide between communitarian and
contractarian corporate governance structures by comparing the
governance structures of the United States, Japan, and Germany.
Section I briefly reviews the communitarian and contractarian
Section II provides the comparative
schools of thought.
foundation, analyzing salient features of corporate governance in
the United States, Japan, and Germany. With this background,
Section III then attempts to address the problem Havel raised by
engaging in a thought experiment about what a blended model, a
and
of
contractarianism
features
combining
model
communitarianism, might look like. The proposed model is one
that considers businesses as mediating institutions-that is, as
corporate communities that compete in the marketplace as well
as support the moral dispositions of their employees and
shareholders. Section IV contains concluding remarks.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY

Corporate governance can be described as the top
management process that manages and mediates value creation
for, and value transference among, various corporate claimants in
a context that ensures accountability to these claimants. 7 This
definition of corporate governance emphasizes the roles of both
For general background on the debate, see Michael Bradley et al., The
5.
Purposes and Accountability of the Corporationin Contemporary Society: Corporate
Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 33-47 (1999). For
views on the corporation as a natural entity, see Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate
Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REv. 273
(1991); David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians,
Contractarians,and the Crisis in CorporateLaw, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373
(1993); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201 [hereinafter
Millon, Theories of the Corporation]. For arguments from the law and economics
literature depicting the corporation as a nexus of contracts, see generally Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (emphasizing the nature of the firm as a center of
contracts to reduce the transaction costs of business); Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
E.g., Bradley et al., supra note 5, at 61.
6.
7.
Id. at 10-11.
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claimants and accountability. Claimants include shareholders,
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, competitors, and even
society at large. Including accountability in the definition of
governance reflects the principle that good governance is a twoway street.
Just as the corporation is responsible to its
stakeholders for governance, governance practices determine how
the stakeholders monitor and control the firm. At the heart of
good governance, therefore, are methods for dealing with both
efficiency and equity.
The corporate governance models that the United States,
Japan, and Germany follow reflect two dichotomous schools of
thought regarding the roles and purposes of the corporation in
modern society. At one extreme are contractarians, who view the
corporation as a nexus of contracts whose sole purpose is to serve
the shareholders. At the other extreme are communitarians, who
consider the corporation a separate
legal entity with
responsibilities not only to shareholders, but also to other
stakeholders and to society at large. The United States provides
an example of a country heavily rooted in a contractarian,
shareholder-primacy approach, whereas Japan and Germany
traditionally have appeared to be more aligned with
communitarian ideals. Upon closer examination, however, shifts
in the corporate governance systems of Japan and Germany
suggest a trend in these largely communitarian-based countries
toward a more shareholder-based approach. At the same time,
commentators have recommended that the United States consider
the virtues of systems that "encourage, if not command,
corporations to take into account the interests of workers and
other nonshareholder constituencies when making strategic
8
decisions."
A. Communitarianism
The communitarian theory views the corporation as a
separate entity, independently capable of doing harm and good. 9
As such, the corporation has social responsibilities not only to
shareholders but also to the firm's other stakeholders and to

8.
Mark G. Robilotti, Codetermination, Stakeholder Rights, and Hostile
Takeovers: A Reevaluation of the Evidence from Abroad, 38 HARv. INTIL L.J. 536,
538 (1997). See also Steven M. H. Wallman, The ProperInterpretationof Corporate
Constituency Statutes and Formulationof DirectorDuties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 163,
169-70 (1991) (suggesting that taking the interests of a corporation's stakeholders
into account affords the directors the flexibility to balance investors' competing
expectations).
9.
Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 41-47.
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society at large.
Under this paradigm, non-shareholder
constituencies receive legislative protections. However, difficulty
arises when these separate interests begin to conflict, as it
becomes difficult, f not impossible, for management to consider
the needs of every possible stakeholder, and no clear delineation
exists in the social, political, or economic realm to help
management make choices.
One of the most positive features of a more communitarian
paradigm is lifetime employment, which gives employees a greater
incentive to develop and supply firm-specific human capital and
encourages stronger employee loyalty. It may facilitate team
efforts, and lifetime employees may be more willing to make
concessions in times of financial distress.
The more concentrated, relatively permanent ownership
structure of corporations in communitarian regimes such as
Japan and Germany offers additional advantages.
Large
shareholder involvement means shareholders can intervene
quickly when a crisis hits. Block ownership facilitates a great
deal of mutual monitoring and could lower the cost of equity
capital. Under a communitarian regime, banks may facilitate the
governance process because they have a great deal of access to
inside information, can lower the cost of debt, and resolve
financial distress much more informally than in a contractarian
regime.
Communitarian systems, however, are not without costs.
The most serious long-term competitive issue for communitarian
countries such as Japan and Germany may be the bias in their
systems against start-ups, research and development, and
human-capital-intensive industries.1 0 The average age of a listed
firm in the United States is fourteen years for the NYSE and
thirteen for NASDAQ."
For the German stock exchange, the
average age is about fifty-five years. 12 In the United States, 40%
of the companies listed on the stock exchange are less than ten
years old; in Japan this figure is 0.7%.13 The OECD has
concluded that compared to the United States, both Japan and
Germany have a comparative disadvantage in the high-technology

10.

Id. at 67.

ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS 19941995: GERMANY 117 (1995) [hereinafter OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY].
12.
Id.
11.

13.
MITSUHIRO FUKAO, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND
THE PERFORMANCE OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 70 (1995).
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sectors. 14 For example, neither Japan nor Germany has a true
U.S.-style venture capital industry.1 5
The bank-centered nature of businesses in communitarian
regimes has related consequences. Banks have a bias against
risk that manifests itself in a bias against start-ups. 16 Banks
focus on assets that can be collateralized, creating a bias against
intangible investments, including research and development.
This may lead to excessive hedging and excessive investment in
insurance.
Communitarian infrastructures often are characterized by
inflexibility in a number of areas, including sourcing strategies,
labor markets, and corporate restructurings. 1 7 Communitarian
companies are less likely to be able to move quickly to meet
competitive challenges from the global product market arena.
Globalization strategies may be hindered because of a vertical
chain of relationships. These relationships may not be portable
across borders due to differences in legal regimes. Intercorporate
holdings pose similar problems for firms considering a global
strategy.
Labor markets also show the inflexibility of communitarian
infrastructures.
For example, in 1996, the average German
manufacturer paid approximately $32 per hour of employee work,
while Japanese manufacturers paid approximately $21 per
hour.' s In the United States, the rate was approximately $17.70
per hour. 19
Inflexible labor markets contributed to high
unemployment rates in Europe in the 1990s, whereas
unemployment has steadily declined in the United States over the
20
past two decades.

14.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY, supranote 11, at 102.
15.
See generally Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and
the Structure of Capital Markets:Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243

(1998).
16.
Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and
Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 865, 881-82 (1997).
17.
Id. at 883.
18.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEPT OF LABOR,

INTERNATIONAL

COMPARISONS OF HOURLY COMPENSATION COSTS FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS IN
MANUFACTURING 1999, tbl. 2 (2000).
19.
Id.
20.
See generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE OECD JOBS
STUDY: EVIDENCE AND EXPLANATIONS, PART I: LABOUR MARKET TRENDS AND
UNDERLYING FORCES OF CHANGE (1994).
From 1980 through 1996, the
unemployment rate in the United States decreased from 7.1% to 5.4%. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPt OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1997, at 845 tbls. 1360, 1361 [hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS]. During the
same period, the unemployment rate increased from 2.8% to 9.0% in West
Germany and from 2.0% to 3.4% in Japan. Id.
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Communitarianism is thus under strain in a world where
capital
flows
internationally,
human-capital-intensive
technologies have become the norm, and organizational
boundaries are more nebulous. The strain comes from the nature
of the corporate strategies that communitarian styles of
governance engender, such as excessive risk avoidance,
overinvestment in capacity, brand and product proliferation,
excessive hedging, absence of external controls, and insufficient
attention to shareholder wealth creation. Nonetheless, even if the
future shuns communitarian governance, it need not shun
socially responsible corporations that exemplify communitarian
values.
B. Contractarianism
Contractarians consider the firm's shareholders as the
primary constituency of concern to management. 2 1 Because they
view corporations as a nexus of contracts, they tend to prefer to
rely on voluntary contracting and market forces to align the
interests of managers and shareholders. Other stakeholders are
presumed to have the knowledge and means to make Coasian
bargains with those persons managing the corporation. 22 Integral
to this approach to corporate governance are the various market
forces, including the capital market, the product market, the
managerial labor market and, perhaps most importantly, the
market for corporate control.
Market forces will discipline
management to act in the interest of the shareholders, the
residual claimants.
The market will penalize inefficient
contracting. Also imperative to this schematic are a public policy
regime and a legal regime facilitating freedom of contract.
The problem with the contractarian approach, however, is the
inevitable lack of perfect market conditions.
Instead, the
environment includes disputes due to ambiguities in language,
unforeseen circumstances, information asymmetries, transaction
costs, and unfortunately, outright fraud. Even greater problems
arise when contracts are attempted in a global environment in
which different legal regimes may make contracting inefficient
and property rights unenforceable.
The problems of communitarianism and contractarianism
reach their zenith when their models are applied at large-scale
levels. For communitarians, as Havel implies, the creation of
large bureaucratic structures typically does not mean that

21.
Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 35-4 1.
22.
Coase introduced the theory that firms consist of a nexus of contracts
designed to minimize transaction costs. Coase, supranote 5, at 386.
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institutions are operated for the benefit of all constituents, but
rather for the benefit of the elites that control centralized power.
As the last decade has shown in Japan and Germany, the
communitarian design can dampen creativity, initiative, and
adaptiveness.2 3 Although the rhetoric of communitarianism is
one that values solidarity, empathy, integrity, and responsibility,
the linkage of these virtues to vast nation-states, and to large
corporations, undermines communitarian virtues themselves
both by reducing their competitiveness vis-d-vis the rest of the
world and, more subtly, by undermining the internal dynamics of
the community itself.
For contractarians, the focus on efficiency and access to
capital makes the manipulation of employees necessary.
Employees easily become known as "labor inputs" and thereby
become depersonalized in a way like, although not to the same
degree as, the depersonalization of socialist states. The need for
treating employees as "labor inputs" or "cogs" is why Havel says
the issues facing IBM and old socialist factories are the same. In
both, human beings adopt a role at work that can restrict rather
than enhance their ability to approach work in a way meaningful
to them. In short, corporations can be alienating and sometimes
resemble socialist (or feudal) states uninterested in human beings
24
because economic criteria are simply too narrow.
Moreover, commentators have noted that the contemporary
world is bureaucratic.2 5
A decision made by a corporate
manager, for example, "disguises and conceals rather than
illuminates and it depends for its power on its success at disguise
and concealment."2 6 In a bureaucratic system, people do not ask
ultimate questions because they assume that they cannot
ultimately adjudicate among various moral traditions. Instead
they rely upon a process which will generate choices and allow
them to determine autonomously what particular option
maximizes individual self-interest. This is precisely the basis of
free-market economics. Free-market economics is based not on

23.
Of course, similar problems were even more dramatically evidenced by
former (and current) socialist states.
24.
The efficiencies of scale and thirst for power are inimical to individual
meaning-making. Indeed, it is this problem that gives rise to Alasdair Maclntyre's
repeated condemnation of bureaucracy as concealing critical assumptions about
meaning. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY (1981); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN
BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (1999); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH
RATIONALITY? (1988).

25.
24-26.
26.

MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY, supra note 24, at
Id. at 103.
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determining the "good" of a product, but on how to efficiently
produce a product that meets market demand.
Consumer choice, legal regulation, and competition
determine what products are acceptable. The manager does not
ask ultimate questions, because asking such questions simply is
not his job as an agent. The model depends upon the power of
managerial efficiency and the ability to conceal the fact that deep
values are at stake in corporate affairs. This Article focuses on
the development of a corporate governance structure that blends
a contractarian model that values transparency, efficiency, and
initiative with a communitarian model that values empathy,
solidarity, integrity, and identity. Put another way, the proposed
blended model seeks to create corporate communities that can
compete aggressively with other corporations in a global
marketplace.
II. COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

What differentiates the governance structures of the United
States, Japan, and Germany are the roles the various
stakeholders play in monitoring and controlling the firm. For
example, in the United States, the primary stakeholder has been
the shareholder, whereas in Japan and Germany, labor
historically also has had a relatively strong voice. None of these
countries, however, take an all-or-nothing approach. Rather,
some of the more communitarian features of Japan and Germany
are finding their way into U.S. governance practices 2 7 as the more
contractarian features of the United States are gradually being
incorporated into Japanese and German practices. 28
The structure that typifies U.S. capitalism traditionally has
been differentiated from both Japan and Germany in the way it
configures the factors that create accountabilities. In focusing on
the well-being of the shareholder, the U.S. governance system has
emphasized efficiency, with impressive results.
A market
designed to provide information transparently to a wide range of
investors has been able to generate effective discipline for
managers to run efficient operations.
The contractarian governance model prevalent in the United
States in large part may be the result of the greater reliance U.S.
corporations place on external capital markets to provide
corporate funding. Investors in such markets are concerned with
27.
For example, see infra note 67 for a listing of more than 40 states that
have adopted statutes permitting corporate directors to consider the interests of
non-shareholder constituencies in making various corporate decisions.
28.
Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 67-77.
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returns on their investments and they demand efficiently run
businesses. This has resulted in a much larger equity market
with relatively liquid funds. More than 9,000 firms are listed on
the three major stock exchanges in the United States: the New
York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and
NASDAQ. 2 9 In contrast, Japan lists only 1,800 firms,3 0 while in
Germany fewer than 700 finms are listed in the equity markets,
although there are 500,000 German corporations. 3 ' Listed firms
account for only about 20% of the corporate revenue in
Germany,3 2 and stock market capitalization as a percentage of
GDP is less than 40%, compared to 57% in Japan and 136% in
33
the United States.
The liquidity provided by American markets also makes
possible contested ownership of corporations themselves.
In
recent years, the United States has accounted for more than half
of all merger and acquisition activity worldwide.3 4
The
combination of liquidity and potential competition provides
further incentives to executives to manage their businesses
efficiently, lest they lose control.
In contrast, the market for corporate control is relatively
inactive in Japan.
Between 1985 and 1989, mergers and
acquisitions accounted for just over three percent of the total
market capitalization, and all were friendly transactions.3 s The
words used to describe takeovers in Japan include "miurisuru"
(to sell one's body), "baishu" (bribery), and "nottori" (hijack),
suggesting a cultural aversion to takeovers. 3 6
Anti-takeover
defenses such as poison pills and golden parachutes are rarely
found in corporate charters or by-laws. Cross-shareholding is
used as an anti-takeover device, although it is limited by
Japanese law.
Cross-shareholding by subsidiaries in their

29.
1997).

THE LGT GUIDE TO WORLD EQUITY MARKETS 500 (Jacqueline Grosch ed.,

30.

Id. at 266.

31.
32.
33.

OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY, supranote 11, at 87.
Id.
For stock market data, see INT'L FIN. CORP., EMERGING STOCK MARKETS

FACTBOOK 17 (1998).

For GDP data, see INTL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL

FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK 437, 525, 897 (1998).
34.

THE

MERGER

YEARBOOK:

U.S./INTERNATIONAL

EDITION

15,

22-23

(Securities Data Publ'g 1999).
35.
STEPHEN PROWSE,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE: A SURVEY OF CORPORATE CONTROL MECHANISMS AMONG LARGE FIRMS IN
THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, JAPAN, AND GERMANY 47 tbl. 12 (Bank for

Intl Settlements, Economic Paper No. 41, 1994).
36.
Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 59. See also A Texas RaiderRocks Club
Japan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 17, 1989, at 15 (discussing T. Boone
Pickens' acquisition of a 20% stake in a Japanese automobile and aircraft parts
manufacturer).
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parents is prohibited, and the Japanese Commercial Code
37
restricts voting by companies with large cross-shareholdings.
The market for corporate control in Germany is also poorly
developed. Between 1985 and 1989, only 2.3% of the market
value of listed stocks was involved in mergers and acquisitions,
compared with more than 40% in the United States. 38 Corporate
combinations tend to be friendly, arranged deals, rather than
hostile takeovers or leveraged buyouts. 39
While there are
informal guidelines, there is no commonly accepted formal
German takeover law, and anti-takeover provisions, poison pills,
40
and golden parachutes have not been introduced.
Disclosure rules also distinguish the United States from
Germany and Japan, in part due to the dependency of U.S.
corporations on the stock market for external financing. For
example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has collected survey data to rate
corporations on their disclosure based on three standards: "full
disclosure," "partial disclosure," or "not implemented." Two-thirds
of U.S. firms surveyed met the full disclosure standard, with the
41
remaining one-third meeting the partial disclosure standard.
In contrast, in Japan, only one percent of the firms met the
standard of full disclosure, while in Germany, no firms met the
full disclosure standard. 4 2 The high level of disclosure in the
United States is likely due in large part to the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, which mandates disclosure of corporate
activity and delegates power to regulate proxy communications to
43
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Rather than focus on the protection of creditors, employees,
or other stakeholders, U.S. accounting rules emphasize the
provision of accurate economic information to potential investors
and shareholders. 4 4 For example, U.S. securities are evaluated at

37.
Roy C. Smith, Restructuring JapaneseFinancialInstitutions, WASH. Q.,
Summer 1999, at 181 (discussing cross-shareholding and its effect on merger and
acquisition activity). See also Rafael La Porta et al., CorporateOwnership Around
the World, J. FIN., Apr. 1999, at 470 (noting that firms are typically controlled by
families or the state except in economies with effective shareholder protection).
38.
PROWSE, supra note 35, at 47 tbl. 12.
39.
Between World War II and 1993, there were only four hostile takeovers
in Germany. JULIAN FRANKS & COLIN MAYER, GERMAN CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE
CONTROL, AND THE OBSTACLES TO HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: LESSONS FROM THREE CASE

STUDIES 1 (London Business School Working Paper, 1993).
40.
Bradley et al., supra note 5, at 56. See also PROWSE, supra note 35, at
46-55 (discussing the market for corporate control and the importance of
transnational corporate control mechanisms).
41.
PROWSE, supranote 35, at 28-29.
42.
Id.
43.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994); 7
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3448-66 (1989).

44.

FUKAO, supranote 13, at 119.
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market price rather than historical cost. 4 S In Germany,
marketable securities are carried at historical cost, and tangible
resulting in an
fixed assets are carried at cost, less 4depreciation,
6
understatement of true asset values.
Despite the emphasis on shareholder wealth, few people see
the current U.S. style of corporate governance as blindly profitoriented at the expense of the community. While employees
suffered greatly at the hands of corporate downsizing in the
1980s, such pain generally was not associated with the takeovers
of the 1990s. Further, employees can use stock ownership to
protect themselves and force management to consider their
interests as part of the fiduciary duty to shareholders. According
to a recent study by the National Center for Employee Ownership
(NCEO), employees now control more than 8% of total corporate
equity in the United States, 4 7 compared with 1% to 2% ten years
ago. 4 8 The NCEO estimated that as of August 1997 employees
owned $663 billion of the estimated $8 trillion in corporate
equity: $213 billion through employee stock ownership plans,
$250 billion through 401(k) and profit sharing plans, and $200
billion through broadly granted stock options and other broad
The growth and impact of employee
ownership plans. 49
ownership is illustrated by the July 1994 acquisition of 55% of
United Airlines by the pilots and machinists unions in exchange
for $4.9 billion worth of salary and other concessions.5 0 Five
years later, the company is operating profitably, and the unions
have realized a profit of several billion dollars.,5 Therefore, it is
no coincidence that the attitude of labor toward management also
Despite some high-profile
has become less confrontational.
strikes, such as the United Parcel Service strike in August 199752
and the General Motors strike in June 1998,53 the number of

45.
Id.
German tax laws generally explain this choice of accounting rules. Id.
46.
at 120-21.
47.
Nancy Rivera Brooks, Advisory May Imperil Worker Stock Options, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2000, at Al, A7.
National Center for Employee Ownership, ESOPs, Stock Options, and
48.
401(k) Plans Now Control 8.3% of Corporate Equity, at http://www.nceo.org/
library/control-eq.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2000).
49.
Id.
50.
Adam Bryant, After 7 Years, Employees Win United Airlines, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 1994, at Al.
51.
Hoover's Online, UAL Corporation,at http://www.hoovers.com/premium/
premium/profile/0/0,2147,11520,00.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2000). See also
UNITED AIRLINES, PROXY STATEMENT (2000).

52.
at Al.
53.

Steven Greenhouse, High Stakes for 2 Titans, N.Y.

TIMES,

Aug. 5, 1997,

Nichole M. Christian, 3,400 Strike G.M. Plant; Assembly Put at Risk,

N.Y. TIMES., June 6, 1998, at A7.
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major strikes in the United States reached a record low of 17 in
1999, idling a total of 73,000 workers for an average of 16 days
54
per strike.
Recent events suggest that the traditional distinctions
between the U.S., Japanese, and German systems may be
changing. The Tokyo Stock Exchange recently has ruled that in
filing their results, all listed companies must disclose their efforts
Increasing pressure for
to improve corporate governance. 5 5
transparency and corporate accountability has led to the
implementation of significant accounting reforms over the past
year.5 6 In Germany, landmark legislation was passed last spring
to authorize share option schemes and share buybacks, curb
voting restrictions, and allow companies to use more liberal, nonGerman accounting standards.5 7 New financial disclosure rules
also have been suggested,5 8 and insider trading laws have been
introduced. s 9
With the apparent convergence toward a more open,
transparent, and liquid external market, it is worthwhile to
compare the corporate governance features of the United States,
Japan, and Germany in an attempt to pull from each approach
the best practices that might be included in a blended model.
The next part of this Article compares the corporate governance
features of the United States, Japan and Germany along the
(1) goals of the corporation, (2) ownership
following lines:
structure, (3) board composition, (4) managerial labor markets,
and (5) executive compensation.
A. Featuresof CorporateGovernance
1. Goals of the Corporation
In the United States, federal law has not been involved in the
internal workings of the corporation and has not weighed in with
a corporate purpose. Instead, corporate law has primarily been

54.
Business Headlines,DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 2000, at 2E (quoting
statistics from the U.S. Dep't of Labor related to strikes of 1,000 or more workers).
55.
No Countryfor Old Men, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999, at 60, 61.
56.
Stephen M. Banker, Climatefor M&A in JapanShifts, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 15,
1999, at S4.
57.
Structural and Regulatory Developments in OECD Countries, FIN.
MARKET TRENDS, Nov. 1998, at 17. See also Bruce Kelly, Corporate Governance is
Key: Investors' Demands Lead to Increased Changes Worldwide, PENSIONS & INV.,
Dec. 14, 1998, at 16, available at 1998 WL 9021062; Greg Steinmetz, German
Shift on Buybacks May Lift Stock, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 13, 1997, at 13, available
at 1997 WL-WSJE 3804492.
58.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY, supra note 11, at 120.
59.
See FUKAO, supranote 13, at 118-19.
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the province of the states. Historically, legislatures only granted
corporate status to organizations that would benefit the public
generally, such as municipalities and public utilities. 60 Through
the dynamics of nineteenth century industrialization, the rise of
the influence of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" theory of social
benefits from self-interested economic acts, and the populist
reforms that swept the nation after the presidential election of
Andrew Jackson, the granting of corporate charters became a
ministerial rather than a legislative act. 6 1 This move undermined
the cronyism that accompanied legislative grants of corporate
charters, but it also minimized the public purposes for which a
corporation had to be accountable. 62 Thus, historically, even in
the United States, there was a tension between the public and
private accountabilities of the corporation, a tension that has
63
raised its head throughout U.S. corporate legal history.
Nevertheless, for the past one hundred years or so, a
corporation has been able to be formed for no more specific
purpose than to "engage in any lawful act or activity for which
corporations may be organized ..
".."64 In 1919, the Michigan

60.
See Michael J. Phillips, Corporate Moral Personhood and Three
Conceptions of the Corporation, 2 Bus. ETHICS Q. 435, 437 (1992) (citing Chief
Justice John Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819)). See also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549
(1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]here was a sense of some insidious menace
inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations.
So, at first, the corporate privilege was granted sparingly; and only when the grant
seemed necessary in order to procure for the community some specific benefit
otherwise unattainable."); Millon, Theories of the Corporation,supra note 5, at 207
(noting that the corporation of the mid-nineteenth century was usually chartered
for a public function).
61.
Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation:Limited
Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 156 nn. 27-31 (1992).
62.
Id.
63.
In 1919, the Michigan Supreme Court decided in favor of private
accountability to the shareholders. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 68485 (Mich. 1919). In the early 1930s, two highly respected legal theorists, Professor
Adolf A. Berle of Columbia Law School and Professor E. Merrick Dodd of Harvard,
took up the debate in their classic series of articles. See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,
For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A. A.
Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REv.
1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties
of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194 (1935). For a more
modem view of the debate, see A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation
Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33
(1991).
64.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(a)(3) (1991). The Revised Model Business
Corporation Act similarly provides that "[e]very corporation incorporated under
this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited
purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.' REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT § 3.01 (1984).
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Supreme Court made it clear that "[a] business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders."6 5 The American Law Institute also asserts that a
corporation's primary objective should be "corporate profit and
shareholder gain."6 6 The adoption of other constituency statutes
by most states, however, has changed long-standing conceptions
of corporate purpose. Previously, shareholder primacy was based
upon, and ensured by, the directors' exclusive duty to
shareholders. Other constituency statutes alter the nature of the
directors' fiduciary duties by allowing, and in some circumstances

requiring, consideration of non-capital stakeholders.
This

change

however, because

is

not

as

Delaware,

fundamental

the place

as

it

67

may

appear,

of incorporation

for

65.
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
66.
1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §2.01(a) (1994).
67.
The following statutes permit directors to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies in any appropriate context: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33756(d) (West 1997) (mandating consideration of non-shareholder constituencies);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5)

(Supp. 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415-35(b) (Michie Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE
§ 30-1702 (1999); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-1-35-1(d) (Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp.
1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 2000); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30() (1999); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 78.138(4) (Michie 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2000); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Michie 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney
Supp. 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59(E) (West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (Supp. 1998); 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 515(a) (West 1995); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992);

WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e) (Lexis 1999). The following statutes permit directors
to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in the context of
transactions for corporate control: ALA. CODE § 10-2B-11.03(c) (1999); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-1202(c) (West 1996) (sale of assets); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1202(C)
(Michie 1996) (sale of assets); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-106-105(7) (reverse
splitting of shares), 7-111-103(3), 7-114-102(3) (West 1997) (authorization of
dissolution after issuance of shares); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 1999); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B. 11-030(3), 271B.12-020(3) (Michie 1989) (sale of assets);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (West 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (West 1991);

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-815(3), -823(3) (1999) (sale of assets); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 293-A:11.03(c), 293-A:12.02(c (Supp. 1999) (sale of assets); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 55-11-03(c), -12-02(c) (1999) (sale of assets); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1999);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-11-103(c), -12-102(c) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (sale of assets); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (Lexis 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995); TEx.
BUS. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.03(c) (West Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a1103(3) (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. llA, §§ 11.03(c), 12.02(c) (1997) (sale of assets);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-718(C), -724(C) (Michie 1999) (sale of assets); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 23B.11.030(3), 23B.12.020(3) (West 1994) (sale of assets).
The
following states and territories do not have specific legislation regarding
consideration of the interests of non-shareholder constituencies: Alaska, California,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and West Virginia.
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approximately 300,000 U.S. corporations, 68

has not adopted

legislation allowing or mandating directors to consider the
In addition,
interests of non-shareholder constituencies.
although there have not yet been efforts to repeal the statutes,
they have been heavily critiqued as nothing more than a shield
used to expand the discretion given to directors, making the
board less accountable to all stakeholders. 69 Another school of
thought argues that constituency statutes "simply ratify
corporate law" and therefore will not produce social
preexisting
70
change.
Traditionally, Japanese corporations have operated to benefit
a small group of owners rather than to maximize shareholder
The corporate governance system emphasizes the
value. 7 1
protection of employee and creditor interests as much or more
has had few direct
than shareholder interests. 72 Management
73
incentives to enhance shareholder value.
German law clearly defines the goals of German
corporations. 7 4 In 1937, the German government adopted a new
business corporations statute, consolidating nearly fifty years of
The law reads: "The
corporate laws and amendments. 75
managing board is, on its own responsibility, to manage the
corporation as the good of the enterprise and its retinue, and the
common weal of folk and realm demand."7 6 The law also provides
that if a company endangers public welfare and does not take
77
corrective action, it can be dissolved by an act of State.

68.
E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking
in Corporate Law, 53 Bus. LAW. 681, 682 (1998); Delaware Secretary of State,
DelawareDivision of CorporationsHome Page, at http://www.state.de.us/corp/
index.htm (last modified May 11, 2000).
William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L.
69.
REV. 385 (1990); James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing With Fire: Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); Rima Fawal
Hartman, Note, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Directors:
Enforceable Obligationsor Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761 (1993).
70.
Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:InterpretingCorporateConstituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 92 (1992).
Alejandro Reyes, Playing a New Tune, ASIAWEEK, Nov. 19, 1999, at 64.
71.
72.
Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 50-60.
73.
Yutaka Imal, Reinvigorating Business Dynamism in Japan, OECD
OBSERVER, Jan. 1999, at 6. But see Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New
System of CorporateGovernance: The QuinquennialElection of Directors, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 187, 222 (1991) (asserting that the structure of stock ownership within
Japanese corporations has aligned the interests of management and
stockholders).
74.
Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 52.
Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern Corporation: Perspectivesfrom
75.
the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 30-31 (1966).
76.
Id. at 40.
Id. at41.
77.
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Although this statute thus contains the first non-shareholder
constituency clause, it is equally noteworthy for its omission of
shareholders from the constituencies to be considered in
management decisions. The statute did not specifically mention
Still, German
shareholders until it was revised in 1965.78
corporate law clearly shows that managers must operate the firm
79
for the benefit of multiple stakeholders, not just shareholders.
The propagandist language used throughout the 1937 Act was
common to Nazi propaganda of the Interwar Period urging
Germans to sacrifice personal interests in the name of the Reich.
However, modem Germany clearly demonstrates that this scheme
of corporate governance does not inevitably lead down the road to
statism, collectivism, and the destruction of individual
entrepreneurialism.
The foregoing history of the German statute foreshadows a
central claim of this paper, to be developed in Section III. To the
extent that the German structure is an example of a
communitarian regime that attempts to link an individual to a
megastructure, it can pose serious risks of coercion and excessive
sacrifice of individual needs to those of the community. Human
beings
authentically
develop
the
sentiments
that
communitarianism champions-for example, empathy, solidarity,
and commitment to the common good 8°-in much smaller
amediating institutions," not in large communities where such
sentiments often are rhetorical fig leaves covering coercive
leadership.
2. Ownership Structure
In the last twenty-five years, the role of the institutional
investor in U.S. corporations has grown dramatically. In 1996,
public mutual funds and other similar investments accounted for
almost fifty percent of all equity in U.S. corporations. 8 ' Pension
funds hold close to twenty-five percent of U.S. shares.8 2 U.S.
households own slightly more than fifty percent of all outstanding

78.

Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 52.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY, supra note 11, at 84. See also
Stefan Wagstyl, Crumbs from the Table, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at 27 (noting
that the German language does not include a phrase for the words "shareholder

79.

value").
80.

See generally ROBERT NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY:

A STUDY IN

THE ETHICS OF ORDER AND FREEDOM (1990) (examining the quest for community as
the "dominant social tendency" of the twentieth century).
81.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supranote 20, at 524 tbl. 808.

82.
Id. See also Stephen L. Nesbitt, Long-Term Rewards from Shareholder
Activism: A Study of the "CaIPERSEffect", J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1994, at
75 (noting that the 50 largest pension funds own approximately 10% of
outstanding U.S. shares).
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domestic shares, representing more than double the percentage
owned by German or Japanese households. 8 3 Share ownership
by banks and other U.S. corporations is small relative to other
developed nations. 84
Traditionally, Japan's industrial organization system has
been defined by the keiretsu, groups of networked firms with
stable, reciprocal, minority interests in each other.8 s Typically,
the firms in a keiretsu are separate, independent, joint-stock
companies that have implicit and relational contracts with each
other on such matters as ownership, governance, and commercial
contacts.8 6 Keiretsu can be either vertical or horizontal. Vertical
keiretsu are networks consisting of a loose collection of firms from
the supplier to the distributor chain.8 7 Horizontal keiretsu are
networks consisting of a loose collection of businesses in similar
product markets.8 8 A large main bank that conducts business
with all of the member firms and holds minority equity positions
in each of the firms usually will be a member of a horizontal
keiretsu.8 9 Relative to the total number of joint-stock companies,
the number of keiretsu in Japan is small. Collectively, however,
keiretsu firms represent approximately 25% of the total sales in
the Japanese corporate sector and close to 50% of the value of all
listed stock in Japan.9 0
History provides a good illustration of how a keiretsu
operates. In 1974 Mazda Motors faced bankruptcy when sales of
its rotary-engine cars plummeted as a result of the oil crisis. 9 1
Mazda was a member of the Sumitomo keiretsu, and the group's
chief bank, Sumitomo Trust, was a major lender and shareholder

83.

OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY, supra note

84.

Id.

11,

at 88 tbl. 23.

85.
Bradley et al., supra note 5, at 56-57. On the subject of the keiretsu,
see W. CARL. KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL (1991); Erik Berglof & Enrico Perotti, The Governance Structure of the
Japanese Financial Keiretsu, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 259 (1994); David Flath,

Shareholding in the Keiretsu, Japan's FinancialGroups, REV. ECON. & STAT. 249
(1993); Hesna Genay, Japan'sCorporateGroups, ECON. PERSP., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at
20; Ronald Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understandingthe Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps

Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871,
894-95 (1993).
86.
Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 57.
87.
Gilson & Roe, supra note 85, at 894.
88.
Id.

89.

See Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and CorporateMonitoring and

Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 399, 401-02 (1989).
90.
ROBERT W. LIGHTFOOT & W. CARL KESTER, NOTE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND GERMANY 6 (Harvard
Business School, Note 9-292-012, 1991).

91.

Mary Ann Maskery, Safety Net: Web of Ownership Between Banks, Auto

Industry Keeps CompaniesAlive, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Aug. 6, 1990, at 1, 28.
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Sumitomo Trust took the lead in
in the car company. 9 2
reorganizing Mazda, dispatching seven directors and forcing it to
adopt new production techniques. 93 The other members of the
keiretsu switched their automobile purchases to Mazda, the parts
suppliers reduced prices, and lenders provided the necessary
credit. 94
As a result, Mazda survived without requiring any
layoffs, although management and workers received smaller
bonuses. 95
Taken alone, none of the Sumitomo keiretsu
members' decisions to save Mazda made economic sense.
Whether the decisions taken together made economic sense
remains a much-debated question. 96
The example, however,
illustrates the degree of sacrifice members of a keiretsu are willing
to undertake to prevent one of its members and that member's
stakeholders from experiencing the pains of market changepains that U.S. management would argue ensures efficiency.
Many people contend that the painful downsizing of U.S.
corporations in the 1980s is at least in part responsible for the
current U.S. economic boom and, similarly, that Japan's refusal
97
to accept such pain has created its current economic crisis.
Evidence suggests that many of the keiretsu bonds are now
beginning to soften or break. For example, parts procurement in
the auto industry has long been viewed as a model of Japanese
vertical keiretsu, but Japanese automakers purchased $15.5
billion of U.S.-made parts in 1993, a six-fold jump since 1986.98
In 1994, Japanese car companies did business with 1,245
Purchasing
companies, compared with only 298 in 1987. 9 9
companies, pressured by global competition, have sought lowercost suppliers outside of their keiretsu networks. 0 0 The merger
of the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), Fuji Bank, and Dai-Ichi
Kangyo Bank (DKB) announced in the fall of 1999, and any
further banking consolidation, will undoubtedly have a significant

92.
93.

Id. at 28.
Richard Pascale & Thomas P. Rohlen, The Mazda Turnaround, 9 J.
JAPANESE STUD. 219, 229 (1983).
Id. at 230.
94.
95.
Id. at 238-39.
96.
See id. at 257-63.
97.
E.g., Brenton R. Schlender, Japan's New Realism: Don't Count This
Superpower Out, FORTUNE, Oct. 31, 1994, at 117, 118 (noting the emergence of a
pragmatic "New Realism" among Japanese businesses in an effort to remain
competitive).
98.
Auto Parts Sales to Japan Rise, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 1995, at 11,
availableat 1995 WL 6166249.
99.
Id.
100. James B. Treece, Nissan Untethers Suppliers-and Itself, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS, Apr. 12, 1999, at 26V.
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impact on the keiretsu system. 1 1 The most likely effect will be
the dilution of the major keiretsu groups' power and influence. In
addition, banks involved in the mergers may have to divest at
industrial companies in order
least part of their stakes in related
10 2
to comply with Japanese law.
Frequently, in Japan, a small group of four or five banks will
control between 20% and 25% of a company's stock.' 0 3 Thus,
despite a prohibition on Japanese banks holding more that five
percent of a single firm's stock, banks may be the only
10 4
shareholders who can easily influence a firm's management.
In practice, however, bank shareholders often will not intervene
in firm management unless the firm performs poorly.' 0 5 The
1°6
largest bank shareholder is also usually the largest debtholder.
The role of banks in financing has been decreasing in the
past decade. Historically, Japan's legal and regulatory regime
was heavily biased against non-bank forms of finance; however,
since the mid-1980s, these restrictions gradually have been
Cross-shareholding is declining, as companies
relaxed. 10 7
recognize that it may no longer have practical value and in fact
may even create obligations that are not good for business in the
Between 1992 and 1998, company crosslong-term.10 8
shareholding decreased from a high of 52% to 45%.109
The ownership structure of equity in Germany also differs
Ownership in
substantially from that in the United States.
Germany is concentrated and controlled in large part by banks.
Banks own approximately 14% of shares of German corporations,
while other German corporations own approximately 40%.110
Bank ownership is high in Germany partly because a substantial
portion of equity in Germany is in the form of bearer stock and
left on deposit with banks."' Banks may vote the shares on

101.
Japan Inc. Faces Radical Change, BANKER, Oct. 1999, at 4; Merge-orSubmerge Fever Spreads as Keiretsu Die Out, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Dec. 21,
1999, at 9.
JapanInc. Faces RadicalChange, supranote 101, at 4.
102.
Bradley et al., supra note 5, at 58.
103.
104.
Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Essay, Lifetime Employment: Labor
Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
508, 529 (1999).
Masahiko Aold, The JapaneseFirm as a System of Attributes: A Survey
105.
and Research Agenda, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE
STRENGTH 11, 21 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds., 1994).
106.
PROWSE, supra note 35, at 24-28.
107.
Id.
108.
Smith, supranote 37, at 190.
Id.
109.
110.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY, supra note 11, at 88 tbl. 23.
FUKAO, supranote 13, at 27.
111.
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deposit by proxy unless the depositors explicitly instruct the bank
i2
not to do so."
However, there are signs of change here as well.
For
example, banks are being encouraged to divest their corporate
shareholdings and to reduce their lending exposures to individual
companies. 1 3 In addition, new laws require German investors to
disclose the details of their share ownership of greater than five
percent in a company," i 4 and foreign ownership in German
corporations has increased as a result of relaxed foreign share
i s
ownership rules.
3. Board Composition
In the United States, shareholders typically elect directors at
annual shareholder meetings. Similarly, shareholders have the
power to remove directors either with or without cause, unless
the articles of incorporation or by-laws limit this power to removal
for cause only. 1 16 Labor is rarely involved in the corporate
governance system. In the majority of U.S. corporations, several
directors will be named from outside of the company. 1 17 The role
of the board of directors is to monitor a management team that it
hires to carry out the day-to-day operations of the company.
Japan, like the United States, uses a single-tier board
structure.1 1 8 Traditionally, Japanese boards have been large,
increasing with the size of the firm."i 9 One of the primary
reasons for the large board size is that company managers
120
received directorships as rewards for loyalty and long service.
Some of the largest Japanese firms have had more than fifty
directors.' 2 '
Another traditional characteristic of Japanese
boards has been a domination by older men, nearly all of whom

112. Id.
113.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY, supra note 11, at 120.
114.
Unhappy Families,ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 23, 25.
115.
See Edward Carr, A Fortress Against Change, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23,
1996, at 3, 5 (noting the "transatlantic attitudes" of many managers due to the
increased globalization of capital markets).
116.
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1991); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 8.08 (1984).
117.

JAMES C. ABEGGLEN

&

GEORGE STALK, JR.,

CORPORATION 183 (1985); FUKAO, supranote 13, at 98.
118.
PROWSE, supranote 35, at 42.
119.
No Countryfor Old Men, supranote 55, at 61.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
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are insiders of the company. 12 2 Most typically, board members
1 23
will be current or former senior and middle management.
However, signs of sweeping change exist within the Japanese
boardroom. For example, in April 1999, Nissan announced a
reduction in its board size from thirty-seven to ten, with a
younger average age and three new directors from Renault, the
French car maker which purchased a 36.8% stake in the
company. 124 Sony was one of the first Japanese companies to
reform its board, reducing the size from forty to ten in 1997 and
directors.125
non-executive
independent,
three
including
Following the changes commenced by Sony and Nissan, nearly
two hundred other companies, including trading houses, leasing
companies, insurers, and supermarket chains, have announced
plans to shrink their boards. 12 6 Reasons for the reductions range
from simple cost cutting to, as in Sony's case, deliberate efforts to
remove day-to-day managers and enable the board to focus on
12 7
hard strategic decisions.
Some Japanese firms have retained large boards but shifted
management decisions to other forums. For example, Matsushita
is now run by a group management committee which meets
weekly and consists of four board members who bring in other
managers as needed. 128
This enables the company to make
12 9
much faster decisions than the traditional approval method.
Other companies similarly have shifted away from consensus
decision-making to a more top-down management system.
Mitsubishi now has a single management committee, composed of
the heads of its previous multiple committees system.' 3 0
In
addition to shrinking their boards, Japanese companies have
discussed importing outsiders to their decidedly inward looking
boards.
The Keiza Doyukai, an association of corporate

122.
Id.
123.
Almost 78% of Japanese directors are promoted from among
employees. FUKAO, supra note 13, at 14. A recent article in The Economist opened
by noting how Japanese company men could empathize with a young Japanese
politician in a popular manga (comic book) series who exclaimed, "Damn these old
bastards," in reference to the aging Japanese company men who are thwarting the
radical change sought by Japan's younger businessmen and politicians.
No
Countryfor Old Men, supranote 55, at 60.
124.
No Country for Old Men, supranote 55, at 61.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
From Squares to Pyramids, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1999, at 7 (Survey:
Business in Japan).
128.
See generally No Countryfor Old Men, supranote 55, at 61.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
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executives, has recommended that at least ten percent of board
3
directors come from outside the company.' '
The system used in Germany is significantly different from
that in either the United States or Japan. In large German firms,
employees select half of the board of directors.' 3 2
Some
commentators
speculate
that
this
practice-known
as
codetermination-traditionally influenced firm management and
stockholders to limit the flow of information to the board and
33
otherwise minimize its functions.'
Modem German companies manifest the codetermination
philosophy through a two-tier board structure. Large firms with
over five hundred employees are required to have this structure,
which divides the oversight role into two functions.' 3 4
A
supervisory board performs the strategic oversight role, while a

management board performs the operational and day-to-day
management oversight role. 13 5
There can be no membership
overlaps between the two boards and membership overlaps
between boards of different corporations are restricted and
rare.1 3 6 In firms with over 2,000 employees, employees of the
firm must comprise half of the supervisory board; shareholder
representatives make up the other half.137
Typically, the
supervisory board chairperson is a shareholder and has the tiebreaking vote. 13 8
Supervisory boards also may include
representatives of firms with whom the corporation has vertical
relationships, such as suppliers and customers. 139
The
supervisory board appoints and oversees the management
board. 140
The management board is comprised largely of the

131.
Id.
132.
Gilson & Roe, supranote 104, at 535.
133.
Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets,
1998 CoLuM. Bus. L. REV. 167, 171-173.
134.
Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 52.
135.
Id.
136.
Id. at 52-53.
137.
OECD ECONOMIC SURvEYs: GERMANY, supra note 11, at 86.
In
companies with fewer than 2,000 employees, the ratio of employee to nonemployee representation is one-to-two. Id.
138.
Id. For more details about German boards, see PROWSE, supra note 35.
See also FuKAo, supra note 13, at 100-01; Alfred F. Conard, Corporate
Constituencies in Western Europe, 21 STETSON L. REv. 73 (1991); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A
Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L.
REv. 73 (1995); Mark J. Roe, German "Populism"and the Large Public Corporation,
14 INTL REv. L. & ECON. 187 (1994); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate
Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993);
Vagts, supra note 75.
139.
Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on CorporateBoards: Impacts and
Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT'L
REV. L. & EcON. 203, 205 (1994).
140.
Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 53.

2000]

A NEW MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERANCE

firm's senior management. 14 1
Consequently, board members
tend to posses technical skills related to the firm's products, as
well as substantial firm- and industry-specific knowledge. The
German board structure thus functions to explicitly represent the
interests of non-shareholder constituents and ensures that major
strategic decisions cannot be made without the consent of
1 42
employees and their representatives.
4. Managerial Labor Markets
While the United States has an active market for managerial
labor, inter-corporate mobility is limited in Japan and Germany.
Historically, employees in these countries have tended to stay
with one company for most of their careers. In Japan this has
been due primarily to the practice of "lifetime" employment, which
causes closure of the external labor market. 14
Employees have
been encouraged to remain at firms because they traditionally
have been provided much greater levels of responsibility,
discretion, benefits, and guarantees by their employers than
comparable U.S. corporations provide. 14 4 An early retirement age
of fifty-five years also has contributed to Japan's limited
managerial labor market. 14 In Germany, limited inter-corporate
movement may be due to extensive apprenticeships and training
146
that build firm-specific human capital.
5. Executive Compensation
In the past few years, U.S. newspapers and magazines have
headlined rising U.S. executive compensation levels. Last year,
the average U.S. Chief Executive Officer's (CEO's) total pay was
442% higher than in 1990.147 The pay increases largely have
been due to the growing use of stock options, a measure initially
introduced to better align executive and shareholder interests by
rewarding CEOs for driving up stock prices. The recent bull

141.

PHILIP GLOUCHEVITCH, JUGGERNAUT: THE GERMAN WAY OF DOING BUSINESS

136 (1992). See also LIGHTFOOT & KESTER, supranote 90, at 10.
142. Bradley et al., supranote 5, at 53.
143.
Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the JapaneseFirm, 28 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1, 11-12 (1990); Gilson & Roe, supra note 104, at 510.
144.
Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A
Proposed CorporateRegime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 587, 630 n.223 (1997).
145.
Gilson & Roe, supranote 104, at 530.
146.
FUKAO, supranote 13, at 59.
147. Jennifer Reingold & Ronald Grover, Executive Pay, BUSINESS WEEK,
Apr. 19, 1999, at 72.
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market has made stock options especially lucrative. As a result,
in 1998 the average total pay for a U.S. CEO was 419 times
greater than the average pay of a blue-collar worker. 148
This
compares with a multiple of fifteen to twenty times in Japan and
49
Germany.1
Stock options were behind the huge differential between the
compensation levels of the heads of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz at
the time of the 1998 merger of the U.S. and German companies.
While Bob Eaton and Jurgen Schrempp had similar salaries, in
the $1-2 million range, Eaton's total pay was seven times that of
his counterpart, largely because he received a $1.2 million
performance-share payment and $10 million in options.' 5 0
In
1988, the average CEO who was a member of the Financial
Executives Institute received four times his or her base salary in
stock options. ' 5 '
Outside of the United States, stock options are infrequently
used as compensation, and when they are used, it is to a much
lesser degree.' 5 2 This may in part be due to complicated laws
and cultural conditions in other countries. Stock options were
illegal in Japan until 1997.'. s
Now, in order for a U.S.
multinational with more than fifty employees to issue stock
options, it must go through a cumbersome annual notification
4
process with the Japanese Ministry of Finance.'1
The Japanese culture traditionally has supported an
egalitarian pay structure.
Directors' pay has been low and
fixed.' 5 5 Although change to pay arrangements has been slow,
recently some large companies have announced plans to give
more weight to individual performance rather than length of
service.' 5 6 This shift is likely to be buttressed by governmentinitiated reform. For example, the Japanese government recently

148.

Id. at 78.

Cynthia G. Wagner, Soaring CEO Salaries, FUTURIST, Nov. 1999, at 9.
150. Shirliey Fung, How Should We Pay Them? ACROSS THE BOARD, June
1999, at 37.
151. The Financial Executives Institute is an Arthur Andersen entity
composed of 88%U.S. and 12% Canadian companies. Id. at 38.
152. For example, out of a sample of 119 large Japanese firms, none used
stock options for top executive compensation. Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive
Rewards and Firm Performance:A Comparisonof Japan and the United States, 102
J. POL. ECON. 510, 535 tbl. 4 (1994). In contrast, all of the 111 large U.S.
corporations included in the sample used stock options to compensate their top
executives. Id.
153.
Who Wants to Be a Billionaire?,ECONOMIST, May 8, 1999, at 15 (Survey:
Pay).
154. Fung, supranote 150, at 38.
155. From Squares to Pyramids, supranote 127, at 8.
156. Brian Bremner, The Stock-Option Option Comes to Japan, BUSINESS
WEEK (Industrial/Technology Edition), Apr. 19, 1999, at 39.
149.
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has announced plans to further deregulate the banking,
securities, foreign exchange, and insurance sectors by 2001.157
In Germany, stock options became legal in 1998.158
However, the response of German Daimler-Chrysler shareholders
to the compensation discrepancy between Eaton and Schrempp
suggests significant cultural resistance to stock option
programs.15 9 Few major German companies have introduced
stock option schemes. 160 Instead, management compensation is
usually in the form of fixed salaries and bonuses.
B. Benefits and Shortcomings of the Various Approaches
Shareholder primacy, though slightly amended, is still the
rule in the United States. However, with a greater swath of the
population owning shares
and companies' unsurprising
realization that bad community relations hurt profits, the
adoption of communitarian values in this still very contractarian
regime is understandable.
Although a contractarian regime
produces more wealth, it also allows a community of shareholders
to reinvest that wealth as they see fit-a very American twist on
the centralized control of corporate social conscience exercised by
Germany and Japan.
The benefits of free markets, transparency, and efficiency
provide opportunities for large organizations that can take
advantage of efficiencies of scale in intra-organizational synergies
and in increasing market share.
Obtaining those benefits,
however, risks simultaneously turning the human beings who
work in large corporations into mere labor inputs. To use Havel's
term, it makes them "cogs."16 1
Two conditions particularly
threaten this kind of alienation. One condition is the extent to
which workers, whether managers or line-workers, have a sense
of ownership of their jobs and with such ownership, a right as
citizens of the corporation to participate in the governance of the

157.
Changing Japan: Whispering Reform, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 1997, at 19;
Jon Choy, Hashimoto Lights Fuse For "Big Bang" in Japan'sFinancial Sector, JEI
REPORT, Nov. 22, 1996, at 1; Laying the Charge for the Big Bang, BANKER, July
1997, at 108. See generally A Survey of JapaneseFinance, ECONOMIST, June 28,
1997, at 56 (magazine insert discussing the reform of Japan's financial system).
158.
Structural and Regulatory Developments in OECD Countries, supra note
57, at 17; Who Wants to Be a Billionaire?,supranote 153, at 15.
159.
See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
160.
Laura M. Holson, Can Europe Learn to Love Americans at the Gate?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, § 3, at 1, 13.
161.
HAVEL, supranote 1, at xx.

856

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:829

institution. 162 The second condition is the extent to which the
corporation acts as a social construct where important
relationships are formed among those who work there.
The heart of the problem is that the anonymity of markets
and the anonymity of large corporate bureaucracies tend to
overwhelm the individuals working in them. 163
Contemporary
governance structures tend to make individuals into what Havel
feared: cogs. While efficiency is a good value, it must be balanced
with work employees value. Ironically, although purporting to
provide a social connection to work, communitarian regimes have
similar problems of alienation when they attempt to provide
"community" in megastructures.
The German system, for instance, is not immune to its own
creation of elites in opposition to a full-fledged participatory
notion of corporate governance. 16 4 To be sure, employees do have
a greater potential role in shaping German corporate behavior.
To the extent such a voice can be raised, the German system has
a mechanism to broaden corporate concern beyond that of
monetary goals. Yet an insular group of creditors and investors
like that created in the German system could be even more
dangerous
to social concerns
because of the lack of

162.
This notion of ownership is akin to a property-like interest in one's
work. The property notion, of course, has long been linked to work. John Locke
"introduced the notion that the origin of material property lies in labor . . .
[p]roperty comes into existence when an individual applies labor to objects
belonging to no one." RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 35-36 (1999). Locke
held that the mixing of labor with property created a property interest in the
resulting product and that the protection of property rights was the raison d'etre
for government. Id. at 37. Abraham Lincoln concurred that labor is prior to, and
independent of, capital:
[C]apital is the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not
first existed ....
[L]abor is the superior.., of capital ....
They do not
deny that there is, and probably always will be, a relation between labor
and capital. The error, as they hold, is in assuming that the whole labor of
the world exists within that relation.
Abraham

Lincoln, Address Before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society,

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Sept. 30, 1859, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, 471, 478 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
163.
See JAMES TUNSTEAD BURTCHAELL, PHILEMON'S PROBLEM:
DILEMMA OF THE CHRISTIAN 101 (1973).

THE DAILY

164. Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate
Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819
(1996). One frequent criticism of the German model is that the shareholder
representative component of the supervisory boards of German companies tends
to be dominated by representatives of a few large German banks, with a small
number of other individuals-many of whom also have close business or
professional relationships to the company on whose board they sit. The implicit
suggestion in the criticism is that the interrelationships among these individuals
may sometimes be too close to allow effective monitoring of corporate
management. Id. at 1822.
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accountability. Centralized control of information and a lack of
U.S.-style sensitivity to pluralistic concerns could make a German
board less concerned with a broad range of stakeholder issues.
To the extent the U.S. system requires significantly enhanced
disclosure to the public and investors, it counteracts the elitism
of the German model. Thus, a model that, like the German
model, allows key stakeholders, such as employees, to have a vote
may be an improvement for the protection of their stakeholder
interests, but to avoid a new set of cronyism, governance
decisions should also be transparent, as U.S. governance
requires.
Two important lessons can be gleaned from the German
First, a mechanism for enhancing stakeholder
situation.
concerns can be designed in the form of an oversight board.
Second, in doing so, it is important not to simply create another
"in-group" which can dominate corporate policy. If an oversight
board is to be designed, it must be small enough to be practical,
yet diverse enough to function as a proxy for pluralistic interests.
Joined with the transparency of the U.S. system, such a board
would have the benefit of a protected group of stakeholders-the
employees-subject to the review of other stakeholders.
Many of the same benefits and criticisms of the German
model also apply to Japan. The Japanese model highlights the
view of corporate life as a social one. Perhaps more accurately,
the Japanese model is more a family model. It is not surprising,
then, that Japanese employees see the corporation as a social
entity as well as an economic one. 165 The reasoning connects
with a normative framework in Japan that is more relational than
what we might expect to acknowledge in the United States. 166 In
Japanese thinking, "a person becomes a full person only through
a social network, and an independent person without a social
network is, even if it is possible, a deviation or negation of its
original form." 16 7 The social network is part of a person's life, but
8
the relationships also continue after death.16
In this relational context, some argue that the task of ethics
"is to define the structure and the mechanism of this relationship
that already exist in our social life through customs and

165.
Bradley et al., supra note 5, at 62.
166.
See generally Mitsuhiro Umezu, Relational Ethics and the Context of
Trust: Understanding the Ethical Basis of Paternalistic Japanese Business,
Presentation at the Meeting of the Society of Business Ethics (1999) (on file with
authors).
Id. at 5.
167.
168.
Id.
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mores." 169 Rather than beginning with a Western notion of selfconsciousness regarding one's autonomy, the Japanese structure
"starts with the two-person community, the smallest unit of
human relationships." 170 This two-person community may be
that of husband-wife or parent-child, but can also include a
relationship between friends. 17 1 The kinds of trust involved in
these relationships differ according to the relationship itself.
There are three kinds of Japanese social relationships. In the
first context, there is a close-knit relationship, such as family and
intimate friends, where the presumption of mutual basic trust is
beyond reasonable doubt. In the second context, one has a
relationship akin to neighbors and casual acquaintances, where
mutual trust is reasonable. In the third context, there are no
reasonable presumptions of trust; people are strangers. 17 2 The
third stage is analogous to what the law considers to be armslength transactions.
For the Japanese philosopher, Mitsuhiro Umezu, the kinds of
relationships people have and the rules associated with those
relationships differ. 173 He is critical of the Western approach of
analyzing business relationships in an arms-length way. 174 The
arms-length approach may be a helpful model for negotiating with
strangers, but the nature of the relationship and the moral
principles governing that relationship are much different in the
community where one works. In that work community, one at
least has the opportunity for bonding in the form of casual
acquaintance and neighbor and possibly even more intimately as
close friend and colleague. Umezu's approach suggests that
between the notions of individualism and communitarianism
associated with megastructures-Germany or IBM, there may be
models where communitarian sentiments can flourish in a
contractarian global setting.
III. A BLENDED

MODEL: BUSINESS AS A MEDIATING INSTITUTION

The U.S. governance model offers advantages of freedom and
transparency, the German governance model provides notions of
citizenship and participation, and the Japanese model offers a
sense of communal identity. Each offers advantages, but each

169.

Id. at 6 (following the Japanese philosopher Watsuji).

170. Id.
171. Id. at 9.
172. Id. at 10-11 (arguing that the West tends not to make distinctions
between these three contexts).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 11.
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also threatens to overwhelm the human beings working for such
a megastructure. Considering "business as a mediating
institution" (BMI) may provide a framework for blending these
three factors. This Section engages in a thought experiment of
what a blended model might look like. In conducting this thought
experiment, the result should provide the freedom and flexibility
of a contractarian model while also being attentive to
communitarian sentiments. This section has four key parts.
The first part provides an overview of BMI distilled by current
scholarship to date. 175 This part particularly emphasizes the
logic and moral epistemology behind why small groups must be
formed within a megastructure in order to foster communitarian
sentiments. The groups, existing as a collective, have strong
contractarian positions from which to engage the outside world.
The second part sketches the idea of a blended model that
acts as its own self-reinforcing model for governance. In this
model, regulation of corporate activities comes more from a
system of checks and balances that empowers those within the
organization to have an effective voice than from relying on
outside regulation. In particular, the voices activated are those of
employees, who are believed to be a special class of stakeholders,
along with shareholders.
The third part describes three main pillars of the blended
governance model, with attention to the specific structures that
ought to be built to achieve the self-regulating system of checks
and balances we advocate. These pillars include economizing,
power-aggrandizing, and ecologizing, natural forces that exist in
In erecting these pillars, the lessons of
all aspects of life.
comparative governance strategies become critically important.
The fourth part assesses what kind of an impact this model
may have on the five comparative criteria set out in Section II.
That is, it analyzes how this blended model would account for the
goals of the corporation, ownership structure, board composition,
managerial labor markets, and executive compensation.

175.

E.g., TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS, GOVERNANCE AND LAW:

BUSINESS AS

MEDIATING INSTITUTION (forthcoming); Timothy L. Fort, Business as Mediating
Institution, 6 Bus. ETHICS Q. 149 (1996) [hereinafter Fort, Business]; Timothy L.
Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of
Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
173, 174-77 (1997).
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A. Business as Mediating Institution: An Overview
Mediating institutions are those institutions standing
between individuals and the larger society. 17 6
Within these
structures human beings obtain their moral knowledge and
personal identity.
Traditional mediating institutions include
family, religious institutions, neighborhoods, and voluntary
associations. These associations are typically rather small and
consequently allow for-indeed make inevitable-face-to-face
interactions with others.
Because of these face-to-face
interactions, an individual's actions make a difference. Unlike
bureaucratic structures, where an individual's actions can
become lost in a megastructure's maze, 177 in a mediating
institution the actor witnesses the impact on another person.
That knowledge, together with the peer pressure from others in
the institution, influences a person to take into account the effect
of actions on others. The individual's conscience is thereby
formed, and the community provides a monitoring and nurturing
function for moral behavior.
For example, sociologist Robert Jackall describes a central
problem of contemporary, large corporations;
separating
individuals from the consequences of their actions.178 In a large
corporation, individuals often cannot see the difference it makes
to shortchange quality or even to embezzle, because they will not
get caught. Moreover, others have written about the "moral
muteness of managers." 179 Frederick Bird studied managers and
found that even those who did care about ethical behavior often
were silent about it because it did not seem tough enough for
hard economic assessment of business strategy or because
introducing moral behavior produced "notoriously indeterminate"
discussion. 180
In contrast, it is difficult in a small group, such as a family,
neighborhood, or voluntary organization, for individuals to avoid
the consequences of their actions. In such organizations, usually
either moral values are agreed upon in advance so that
accountability criteria are clear or the members of the group
know each other well enough to be able to confront each other.

176.
Fort, Business, supranote 175, at 150.
177.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting Alasdair Maclntyre's
condemnation of bureaucracy).
178.

ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES:

THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS

127-28 (1988).
179.
Frederick B. Bird & James A. Waters, The Moral Muteness of Managers,
CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall 1989, at 73.
180.
Id. at 76-79.
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In addition to the traditional forms of mediating institutions,
much of a person's conscious life will be involved with work.
Because so much time is spent working, perhaps more so now
than has been spent in previous eras of human history, there is a
need to consider the extent to which businesses also should be
mediating institutions.
Some have attempted to apply the concept of mediating
institutions to the free market.' 8 ' Unfortunately, in doing so,
they take a phrase, "mediating institution," and use it without
regard to the moral forming content resulting from a small
community which nourishes ethical behavior through face-to-face
interactions. Richard Madden provides a classic description of
the corporation and weds that description to the mediating
analogy when he writes that the corporation provides jobs and
benefits to
benefits to employees and various other economic
8 2
charities.'
and
customers,
investors,
suppliers,
The corporation mediates the relationship between the
individual and the amorphous ambiguity of life by providing the
monetary return so that individuals can have financial security,
183
owners can realize profit, and charities can be funded.
Virtually nothing is said about obtaining identity except that
identity is characterized by the ability of the individuals to choose
what they can do with this monetary return. Madden is clear
that ethical virtues are necessary for the proper functioning of
business, but he also argues that size "has relatively little to do
with whether or not an organization can serve as a mediating
structure." 18 4 If, however, others are correct in describing these
structures as "the people-sized institutions, the mediating
institutions where people 'act as neighbors,m ' s then the large
corporation can rarely be called a mediating institution.
The classical description of the corporation lacks the
18 6
communal element necessary to provide meaning and identity.
Of course, the corporation, even as a megastructure, can very
well foster the common good by satisfying customers, making a
return for investors, creating new wealth and jobs, generating
upward mobility, promoting invention and ingenuity, promoting
progress in arts and sciences, and diversifying the interests of the

181.
182.

Fort, Business, supra note 175, at 155-60.
Richard B. Madden, The Large Business Corporation as a Mediating

Structure, in DEMOCRACY AND MEDIATING STRUCTURES:

A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY 106,

115-16 (Michael Novak ed., 1980).
183. Id. at 112-15.
184. Id. at 110.
185.
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD:
TO THE CHRISTIAN CAPITALIST 269 (1992).

186.

E.g., Madden, supranote 182, at 107.
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republic, 1 87 but such goods are not goods of creating meaning
and identity. Nor are such institutions necessarily communities
that foster virtue and solidarity. Thus, although some may wish
to characterize businesses as mediating institutions, businesses
do not necessarily nourish solidarity, compassion, empathy, and
respect for others. Saying that businesses are not necessarily
mediating institutions does not mean, however, that they cannot
become mediating institutions.
Considering business as a mediating institution provides a
sense of individual empowerment and responsibility and an
account of human nature that takes seriously the hardwired
nature of human beings as social creatures formed by their moral
communities.
Because it takes the issue of size seriously,
considering business as a mediating institution does not suggest
that corporations are responsible to all facets of the community,
but instead suggests that business should take itself as a
community seriously.
Indeed, at the heart of communitarian sentiment is the belief

that

the

individual.

community's

common

good

is

connected

to

the

This belief requires stakeholder confidence in

the

community. American constitutional history provides an example
of the relationship between the size of the community and the
confidence of its members in it.

To draw from U.S. constitutional

history, 18 8 some have argued that both the Federalists and the
Anti-Federalists agreed that in a democracy, obtaining and
maintaining the confidence of the people were critical because,
without it,

authority would

1
coercion of the sword."

8 9

have

to resort to "force and

the

187.
MICHAEL NOVAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING: WORK AND THE EXAMINED LIFE
139-45 (1996).
188.
See generally Larry Kramer, The Confidence of the People: Size,
Representation, and the Constitutional Role of Political Parties (Nov. 5, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
189. Id. at 27. (quoting New York Governor George Clinton).
At bottom, this Anti-Federalist concern for the people's "confidence" in
lawful authority rests on a keen appreciation for the fact that popular
government is, to some extent, a subjective phenomenon:
a collective
state-of-mind expressed in popular political culture. It depends on people
believing that government acts for them, that it follows their wishes and
can be controlled by them; it depends on people believing that government
is, in a word, theirs. Perceptions matter because they affect how people
behave, how they deal with the government and its laws--and so how the
government deals with them. People who have confidence in their rulers,
who believe that representatives are properly responsible to the needs and
desires of constituents, are more likely to obey whatever laws the
government enacts.
Id. at 30-31 (citation omitted).
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Obtaining this confidence, according to the Anti-Federalists,
was dependent upon personal interaction between representative
and citizen. 9 0 The Anti-Federalists believed in a relationship
between the governed and governor that was fairly rich. The
relationship was not based on a particular interest, but had the
character of a more complex relationship among people within
their community.
In small electoral units, leaders had to mix with the people
and even prostrate themselves before votes. 19 1 As wild as some of
these campaigns may have been, the leaders got to know voters
and vice versa. This style of politics, however, was doomed by the
constitutional opponents who saw "that representatives who were
not known personally and could not mix with voters would lose
the confidence of the people. Distancing politicians from politics,
19 2
they understood, would come with a cost."
Eventually, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson formed the
first political party as a response to this problem l9 3 The reliance
on parties, which are sometimes classified as a kind of mediating
institution, l9 4 has also been noted by organizational theorist and
business ethicist Michael Keeley. 19 s
Keeley notes that the
founders' solution for avoiding the religious and other warfare of
the centuries leading to the American Revolution was to place
196
governance in the hands of the people.
Furthermore, Keeley contends that although an Aristotelian
view of ethics, such as that expressed by the Anti-Federalists and
contemporary business ethicists who rely on virtue and
communitarianism, is not bad, it may not be enough to prevent
97
"abuses of power by bosses or cynical reactions by workers."'
According to Keeley, more emphasis is needed on governance
19 8
structures.

190. Id. at 35.
191.
Id.at 62.
192.
Id. at 76.
193.
Id.at 85.
194. Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1479, 1480 (1994).
195. Michael Keeley, A 'Matter of Opinion, What Tends to the General
Welfare': Governing the Workplace, 10 Bus. ETHICS Q. 243, 247 (2000).
196.
Id. at 246.
197.
Id. at 248.
198.
Id. Keeley writes:
Perhaps managers shouldn't [treat employees differently than other
stakeholders] if they want employees to act like other stakeholders: like
individual utility-maximizers in the marketplace.
But managers, in
claiming authority over employees, expect them to act differently. No one
else is expected to care very much about the organization or its good.
Managers don't expect customers to put the good of the organization above
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Employees, like shareholders, are a special class of
stakeholders. Keeley concludes his view of the challenges for
twenty-first century business by saying the challenge is "to devise
more popular theories of the corporation, to close the gap between
governing fiction and reality in the workplace." 19 9 This Article
now turns to a discussion of this kind of model, with special
attention on participatory form of governance.
B. Blended Model
Because reliance on coercion and ideology will inevitably
require the excessive sacrifice of the individual for the common
good, people must rely on "legitimate institutions" that balance
the importance of individual human beings with communal
goods. 20 0 Those institutions recognize the importance of small
groups combined with property protection and individual
rights. 20 1 In short, a balanced corporation would be one where
participants within the organization have the requisite voice and
power to have economic and non-economic concerns expressed
and integrated into their business communities. Put another
way, in such structures there is a sense of partnership among the
participants because of a rich feedback loop.
As noted above, the most tangible mediating institution is a
Yet, "[f]amily
family, which is the most basic community.
members do not ordinarily experience themselves as part of this
family structure. Every human being sees herself as a unit, a
whole, interacting with other units."2 0 2 In order to preserve the
reality of autonomy with the reality of one's networked identity,
family therapist Salvador Minuchin uses the term "holon" to
describe the idea of holos, meaning whole, and the suffix on,
20 3
which suggests a particle or part such as a proton or neutron.

their own interests. They don't expect this of investors. They don't really
expect it of temps. Generally, it's only expected of full-time employees. It
seems reasonable for employees, in return, to expect some say in the larger
goods they are supposed to place before their own.
Id. at 251.
199.
Id. at 252.
200.
Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, Complex Societies: The Evolutionary
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
Origins of a Crude Superorganism, 10 HUMAN NATURE:
BIoSoCIAL PERSPECTIVE 253, 272-73 (1999).
Id. Anthropologist Roy Rappaport calls this kind of institution a
201.
"cybernetic form." This denotes "a structure or form" providing "negative feedback,
such that deviations of the states of components of the loop from reference values
initiate processes tending to return those states to their reference values." ROY A.
RAPPAPORT, ECOLOGY, MEANING, AND RELIGION 76 (1979).
202.
SALVADOR MINUCHIN & H. CHARLES FISHMAN, FAMILY THERAPY TECHNIQUES

11(1981).
203.

Id. at 13.
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Holons belong to the whole of the family, but are also part of
other wholes as well. 20 4 Thus, families are examples of systems
in which "objects are interrelated with one another."20 5 In such
systems, a feedback loop is necessary in order to grow and
maintain a state of dynamic equilibrium. 20 6 By analogy, the
basis of a corporation acting as a mediating institution provides a
way for individuals to act within the mediating unit while
simultaneously being linked to other systems. The enhanced
opportunity to actually communicate with others in a "humansized" setting fosters interaction and empathy. This interactive
engagement develops communitarian sentiments of affection and
empathy.
In family businesses - which are unique combinations of two
kinds of mediating institutions - an important way to develop a
notion of community spirit is the unsurprising, and often
unpracticed, solution to listen, "establish two-way performance
evaluations," and "encourage open communication in the
family." 20 7 In short, one central way of creating a system which
functions in a state of balance is to engage the most relevant
stakeholders in the system unit. In fact, a leading proposal for a
self-enforcing model of corporate law suggests "direct participants
in the corporate enterprise (shareholders, directors, and
managers), rather than indirect participants (judges, regulators,
legal and accounting professionals, and the financial press)." 20 8
Yet, shareholders are not enough. Employees are also a
special class of stakeholders, and as two scholars of corporate
culture note, "[like families, villages, schools, and clubs,
businesses rest on patterns of social interaction that sustain
them over time or are their undoing. They are built on shared
interests and mutual obligations and thrive on cooperation and
friendships."2 0 9 Corporations are the loci for a good deal of other
social interaction that is directly related to the financial success
of the corporation itself. To be a self-enforcing model attuned to
the realities of the workplace, corporate governance should be
configured to foster an active engagement of shareholders and

204.
205.

Id. at 14-15.
Gail G. Whitchurch

& Larry L. Constantine,

SOURCEBOOK OF FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS:

Systems Theory, in

A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 325, 325

(Pauline G. Boss et al. eds., 1993).
206.
Id. at 334.
207.
Benjamin Benson, Do You Keep Too Many Secrets?, NATION'S Bus., Aug.
1989, at 42, 44.
208. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911, 1916 (1996).
209.
Rob Goffee & Gareth Jones, What Holds the Modem Company Together,
HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 133, 134.
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employees.
While involving all stakeholders in corporate
governance may create too many masters, 2 10 reinforce managerial
authority, 2 1 ' and risk gridlock, 2 12 a limited set of stakeholdersshareholders and employees-would significantly diversify the
voices heard in corporate governance. These parties could act as
proxies for the concerns of other stakeholders because employees
are also members of the community at large. Adding employees
to the corporate governance structure gives a voice to both
empathy and efficiency.
C. Governance Prongs
In his influential book on business ethics, 2 13 William
Frederick provides significant evidence from nature that there are
three recurring values in all elements of life.
The first is
economizing, which is the basic activity of converting raw
materials into useful resources. 2 14
The second is poweraggrandizing, which is the quest for status and power that occurs
in all life forms to some degree. 21 s The third is ecologizing, which
refers to the linkages between members of species and species
themselves that create the diverse web of life that supports longterm survival. 2 16
This tri-partite structure relates to a
characterization of various aspects of political economy in terms
of the political, economic, and cultural/moral sectors 2 17 and is a
helpful model to utilize when considering business as a mediating
institution.218
1. Economizing and Property
Economizing is a priority of any corporation. As Frederick
describes it, economizing acts as a culture's metabolism,
converting raw materials into useful products and services. 2 19 To
do so in an adaptive way places a priority on efficiency. To the

210.
E.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2.4 (1986).
211.
E.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under
State NonshareholderConstituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 54-55, 70-71
(1991).
212.
E.g., Hanks, supranote 69, at 111.
213.
WILLIAM C. FREDERICK, VALUES, NATURE, AND CULTURE IN THE AMERICAN
CORPORATION (1995).

214.
Id. at 30.
215.
Id. at 57-78.
216.
Id. at 134-67.
217.
MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 14 (1982).
218. Timothy L. Fort, How Relationality Shapes Business and its Ethics, 16
J. Bus. ETHICS 1381 (1997) (providing a rationale for how these naturalistic forces
are present in corporate settings).
219.
FREDERICK, supranote 213, at 30.
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extent corporations can maximize the value they produce in
relation to the cost incurred by their effort, they are rewarded
with profit and a higher market valuation. 220 The optimal goals
of this process of efficiency are the survival and growth of the
organization. As a result, efficiency and the transparency that
makes corporations efficient-through vibrant and liquid capital
markets-promotes a valuable adaptability.
One key governance step, then, is to encourage the open
markets that the United States is known for. Indeed, as indicated
in Section II, this is already occurring in other countries. They
see the efficiency and competitiveness that an open, transparent
system provides and the obvious economic rewards associated
with it. Strong disclosure laws, accounting principles that value
assets according to their market value, liquidity of markets, and
free transferability of shares all promote this kind of corporate
efficiency. In short, corporations ought to be accountable for
their economic performance, and these legal regimes foster that
accountability.
In addition to overall efficiency, there is the dimension of how
each significant stakeholder can maximize its own economic
utiles. The open market mechanisms of the previous paragraphs
go a long way to achieve this for shareholders. We have already
argued that employees are a special group of stakeholders. One
traditional way of assuring that individuals have the ability to
control their own work is to emphasize the property interest they
have in their work.
Anthropologists and historians have noted cultures that
recognize property rights in songs and rituals 2 2 1 and today, of
2 22
course, we recognize property rights in patents and copyrights.
Similarly, following John Locke's 2 23 logic linking an individual's
work to a property interest in his work and Abraham Lincoln's
emphasis on the priority of labor over capital, 2 24 the notion of
property rights could be enhanced in an individual's work.
Property rights enable individuals to feel more like they have an
ability to influence the factors that affect their lives. Mediating
institutions have this kind of influence; the individual is not
simply at the mercy of an amorphous "society," but instead is a

220.
See generally Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory,
Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 119 (1992) (examining the
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of preventing corporate takeovers "as if
they were non-value-maximizing wealth transfers").
221.
PIPES, supranote 162, at 80.
222.
Id.
223.
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Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
224.
Lincoln, supra note 162, at 478.
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constitutive part of that community with an influence on it. In
particular, by strengthening the right of employees to vote in their
corporate community, they become citizens of their corporate
community. This could be done in the following ways, the list of
which is meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive.
One way to encourage property rights in employment would
be for employees within various divisions or teams to state what
their norms are and should be. Without that, the members of the
organization do not relate to each other as human beings, but as
interests, stereotypes, and ciphers.
By engaging in the
development of aims or norms, or by simply telling stories, the
individual presents a richer revelation of his person. In addition
to the norms required by laws, such as the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the members of these smaller communities-within-acorporation at least should have the ability to vote for the norms
that govern the behavior within their group and to put it in
writing. For instance, subgroups can meet to determine what
values they believe their subgroup should respect. Evidence
suggests that the list of values may not be as diverse as one
might think, 2 25 but there is a psychological difference created by
contributing to the norms by which one is governed rather than
by being told those rules. 22 6 The ownership one has in those
rules acts as a ratification of the rules themselves. Because small
groups can also lurch toward tribalism, writing down the rule
further acts as a transparent protection against the kind of
227
oppression that a small group can perpetrate.
This kind of ownership over one's direct work experience is
akin to models of workplace engagement that quality theorists
advocate. 2 28 The heart of their argument is two-fold: (1) that
refined statistical measures are necessary in order to properly
understand whether a product or service is being produced in a
high-quality way, and (2) that to make things in a high-quality
way, one must directly engage the person working on the product
22 9
to contribute his ideas of how the product can be improved.
Similarly, another way to provide this kind of citizenship
voting, matched with property, is to expand the use of Employee
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPS). ESOPS link efficient work with
a direct property right. With the traditional property interest-in

225.

(1995).
226.
227.

RUSHWORTH M. KIDDER, How GOOD PEOPLE MAKE TOUGH CHOICES 90-92

Kramer, supra note 188, at 30-31.
See

generally MICHAEL

KEELEY,
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ORGANIZATIONS 129 (1988) (discussing James Madison's views on controlling
interest groups).
228.

E.g., W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRISIS (1986).

229.

JOHN S. OAKLAND, TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT 29-41 (1989).
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this case, a share of stock--comes a right to vote for items such
as the corporate board of directors, provided that the employee
2 30
does not simply transfer the right to vote to someone else.
Indeed, a greater set of incentives for the utilization of ESOPs
could accomplish a significant portion of this first pillar's
objectives.
2. Power-Aggrandizement-Subsidiarity
As the framers of the Constitution knew, owning property
itself provides an important check against unbridled executive
power.
They knew this because of evidence that individual
property rights neutralized royal power in England. 23 '
The
foregoing proposal relative to property rights thus has
implications for checks against executive power as well. Beyond
this, however, the notion of subsidiarity checks excessive
centralized power.
Sociologist Robert Nisbet argues that
centralized government's chief opponents were mediating
institutions. 23 2 These institutions-families, guilds, churches,
and voluntary associations-command allegiance from members
at the expense of loyalty to megastructures. 2 33 Rather than
allowing such groups to form on the rallying point of alienation, it
would seem more constructive to nourish them within a context
of corporate and global good.
In corporate terms, some significant degree of autonomy
should be given to subunits within the corporation. The "team"
concept of contemporary management does this, although
2 34
turnover makes equating "team" and "community" dangerous.
J. Irwin Miller, longtime CEO of Cummins Engines, required that
no plant have more than five thousand workers. 2 35 Beyond this
number, he thought, one could not generate a unifying culture.
Thus, a second check designed to create a system in which
corporate governance fosters impartial treatment of its members
and inspires its members to commune to a common good is that
of creating mediating institutions within the corporate structure.
First, as already suggested, the mediating institutions within
the corporation can establish their "aims." It is important to

230.
231.

See supranotes 47-50 and accompanying text.
PIPES, supranote 162, at 121-58.

232.

See generally NISBET, supranote 80.

233.

Id.

234.
RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM, 106-17 (1998).
235.
DAvID BOLLIER, AIMING HIGHER: 25 STORIES OF How COMPANIES PROSPER
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establish clear aims in order to force psychological attention to
236
the multiplicity of goods that human beings possess and value.
Without concrete expression of those goals, it is difficult for any
organization to attend to the multiplicity of values that its
members may bring to the workplace. Instead, a default to
efficiency and only efficiency may replace the members' values.
As has already been noted, however, this emphasis on efficiency
may not fully account for all interpersonal dynamics within the
firm.
A mediating institution either could ask its members to
nominate, discuss, and vote on what values it holds important, or
it could tell stories about what is meaningful to individual
members of the group. These techniques elicit the moral goods of
the constituents which can become aims to which members
aspire and hold each other accountable in addition to-not
instead of-the traditional corporate aim of profitability. It is
theoretically possible that these aims could be destructive. A
group could aim, for instance, to abuse minorities. This Article's
proposal, however, is made with the expectation of a regulatory
environment in which there will be limits on such activity and
with transparency of those aims so that groups are accountable
for their actions.
In between communal moral aims and the capacity (through
property rights and voting) to influence corporate policy lie the
various layers of corporate bureaucracy. It is important to link
the notions described herein so such a bureaucracy does not
eliminate them. Institutional economists argue that consensus
decision-making is inefficient. 23 7
Instead, they argue for
hierarchies, so that there are clear lines of power and
authority. 23 8
These are similar to what anthropologists call
simultaneous hierarchies. 2 3 9
In legal terms, this economic
argument for hierarchical control of corporate decisions makes
the master-servant aspect of agency law one that characterizes
2 4°
employer-employee relationships.
Another model is that of sequential hierarchies. In these
structures, small (mediating) groups elect a representative to
articulate the group's consensual decisions with other small

236.
Joshua D. Margolis, Psychological Pragmatism and the Imperative of
Aims: A New Approachfor Business Ethics, 8 Bus. ETHICS Q. 409, 417-20 (1998).
237.
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Gregory A. Johnson, Organizational Structure and Scalar Stress, in
THEORY AND EXPLANATION IN ARCHAEOLOGY 389, 407-417 (C. Renfrew et al. eds.,
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groups "up-the-ladder."24 1 This process continues so that every
decision is made within a small group where there is face-to-face
interaction. Often, the representative of the initial group changes
according to the issue, so a group having multiple leaders
reinforces that consensus. 2 42 These varying representatives are
known as "sodalities" and they serve to keep each separate
mediating institution open to the views of others. 243 Having such
a process keeps the mediating institution open to the views of
others, thereby helping to preserve its adaptability.
These
structures require the face-to-face interaction necessary for the
development of moral empathy and provide a structure to make
clear the moral aims that exist within the corporation in addition
to its economic aims.
In short, the creation of vibrant subgroups creates
communities where empathy, commitment to the common good,
and concern for the welfare of a variety of stakeholders take
place. These kinds of subgroups can be integrated within the
corporation itself. The authority of these groups does not
necessitate capitulation of strategic thinking to full-fledged
workplace democracy, but it does provide an opportunity for
individuals to maximize their influence on those things that
matter to the workers directly.
3. Ecologizing Values-Communication
Mediating institutions within corporations, equipped with a
kind of property right, link personal moral identity with corporate
policy and bring to corporate discussions the variety of human
goods and experience that exist within any organization. Some
have argued that communication serves as the central natural
law principle. 244 Similarly, this construct is a mechanism for
configuring institutions so that communication can be more fully
developed. Although not all intractable moral disputes are simply
a matter of needing a good chat, open communication is a
powerful tool.
Not only can it reveal inconsistencies and
commonalties allowing people to find ways to work together, the
very commitment to communicate is a validation of human
respect and dignity. Indeed, revival of civic republicanism, during
the 1980s, scholars argued that the commitment to dialogue was

241.
242.
243.
244.

See Johnson, supranote 239, at 392-98.
Id.
Id.
E.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 186 (1964).

872

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:829

a central tool to transform self-interested individuals into citizens
2 45
concerned with the common good.
In corporate terms, the importance of open communication
among constituents can be demonstrated by a recent study,
which suggests ways to handle downsizing. For instance, to
mitigate the "downside" of downsizing, a four-step process is often
recommended. 2 4 6 The process is one that can be considered a
way to enhance a sense of partnership, even in situations where
one is being removed from the partnership.
In step one, the decision to downsize is made only as a last
resort where it is necessary as part of a long-term vision for the
company. 2 4 7 In step two, actually planning the decision, a crossfunctional team that has insights into constituent needs and can
speak on behalf of stakeholders should be formed. 2 48 This team
should identify all the affected constituents, use experts (such as
outplacement companies or government training programs) to
assist downsized workers, train managers how to communicate
the decision, and supply information to employees about the
realities of the business. 24 9 In step three, announcing the
decision, the company should explain the business rationale for
the decision, have senior managers announce it, notify employees
in advance of the effective date, beat the media to the
announcement, and offer employees the day off.2 5 0

Finally, in

implementing the decision, the company should tell the truth and
"overcommunicate."2 s 1 It should also involve employees in
downsizing decisions, exercise fairness (in terms of some kind of
objective criteria) as to separation, keep its promises in terms of
its timetable, help department employees find other jobs, allow for
voluntary separations, provide generous benefits and career
counseling, and train survivors. 25 2 Through this process, the
corporation will maintain trust and minimize productivity
3
losses. 25

245. E.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
246. Karen E. Mishra et al., PreservingEmployee Morale DuringDownsizing,
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 1998, at 83, 86.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 87.
249. Id. at 87-88.
250. Id. at 89-91.
251. Id.at 92.
252. Id. at 92-94.
253. For a more skeptical view of the importance of corporate culture, see
Charles M. Yablon, Corporate Culture in Takeovers, 19 CARDOZo L. REv. 553
(1997). Yablon compares corporate culture to arguments about God. Id. at 55356. To some, he suggests, God/culture is worthy of intense study. Id. at 553. To
"atheists" culture plays no role in takeovers. Id. at 554-55. To "agnostics" culture
might well exist. However, they believe that it is better to act under the
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D. Impact on ComparativeCriteria
The tri-partite model emphasizes the importance of property
rights with citizenship participation. This is both a U.S. and a
German strategy. It is American to the extent that it relies upon
transparent disclosure of each subgroup and it is German to the
extent that it features employee participation in the governance
process.
The model also emphasizes the importance of mediating
institutions, or subgroups, within the organization in order to
balance power. This is both a U.S. and a Japanese strategy. It is
American to the extent that mediating institutions have
25 4
and in
historically been an integral component of civil society
its concern for creating checks to accumulation of power. It is
Japanese in that it relies upon subgroups within the organization
to be akin to families or, in even more Japanese terms, to be like
Quality Circles. 2 55 In such small groups, work is social as well as
productive. In fact, the two often go together.
Finally, the model also emphasizes communication. This is
an aspect of all three structures, although the members of the
governance structure among whom communication takes place
In BMI, it takes place not simply among creditors,
differs.
officers, or capital markets, but among those who finance and
truly operate the business.
1. The Goals of the Corporation
The goals of U.S., German, and Japanese governance
Corporations must compete in global
structures differ. 25 6
markets and doing so has advantages of efficiency as measured
Corporations, as collective entities, should
by profitability.
operate according to contractarian models in this competitive
environment. In BMI, these institutions do compete with each
other, and their activities will be disciplined by external capital
markets. Yet, in addition to the goal of shareholder protection,
there is also a goal that those who work for the organization are
allowed to be involved in work that enables them to flourish as
human beings. BMI thus stands as a possible regime that allows

assumption that such a culture is not really there because of the difficulties
associated with it. Id. at 555.
See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 30-45
254.
(Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
For a discussion of "Quality Circles," see Robert E. Cole, Quality
255.
Circles, in QUALITY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 85 (Loren Walsh et al. eds., 1986).
See supra Part II.A. 1.
256.
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individuals to voice their concerns in a small, familial setting,
while simultaneously being open to competitive market moves.
The remaining comparative factors are ways that this balance is
accomplished.
2. Ownership Structure and Composition of Board of Directors
Rather than an ownership structure focusing only on
shareholders or on a small clique of creditors, BMI blends
shareholder and employee ownership. The ownership structure
has three components. One component is in ownership of shares
of the company. As this Article argued, a transparent model, as
followed by the United States, provides protection to shareholders
by emphasizing full disclosure and liquid markets. These act as
disciplinary mechanisms against managerial misfeasance and
provide a model superior to the secretive workings of German and
Japanese systems. ESOPs also enhance the ownership interests
of employees.
The second component of ownership is that employees have a
sense of ownership over their environment and the work they do.
The ability to have control brings a communitarian dimension to
work in a forum small enough to truly be a community.
Recognizing this dimension of "ownership" is an important
supplement to financial notions of ownership. By recognizing it, a
communitarian sentiment of living in a workplace community can
be combined with contractarian competitiveness in the
marketplace through the collective action of the corporation as a
whole.
Finally, there is ownership in a system of checks and
balances that represents to the board the variety of values, both
economic and non-economic, that members of the corporate
community bring with them to work. As the research from
Hampden-Turner on Anheuser-Busch suggests, the workplace
may not be inimical to productivity, but a high-context
environment may actually make the workplace
more
25 7
productive.
Thus, "ownership" contains several nuances. Each of these
nuances can be captured by BMI and in doing so, BMI can
provide a blended model.
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3. Managerial Labor Markets and Executive Compensation
Finally, the U.S. model provides significant opportunities for
managers to migrate to other finms and to do so with significant
compensation. As a result, there is competition for talented
managers and a system leading to a higher differential between
25 8
highest and lowest paid workers in the corporation.
Undoubtedly, complex business organizations need talented
individuals and there may be a correlation between that talent
and concrete returns on investment. Nevertheless, there is a
danger in the differentiation between highest and lowest paid.
Anthropologists advise that there "is every evidence . . . that
humans' Pleistocene evolutionary experience did not prepare us
to tolerate more than the most minimal command and control
institutions.
Nor were we prepared to tolerate much
inequality."2 5 9 The German and Japanese models create less
differentiation in compensation.
One way to mitigate the kind of resentment that could occur
with high differentiation, assuming that such a differentiation is
needed to be competitive and attract desired managers, is to have
all of those in the organization have a voice in corporate
decisions.
This would occur in a republican, representative
model rather than a democratic model of corporate governance.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that significant differentiation would
be more tolerable if it had wide-based support within the
organization.
At the same time, of course, it is possible that such a scheme
would prevent such differentiation. Although this could cause a
competitive disadvantage, there may be countervailing factors to
limit this danger.
First, with information about competitive
markets, employees may realize the necessity of paying top talent
well. Second, if the more broad-based governance structure
brought with it concerns and values to make the corporation a
satisfying place to work, more than money may be available to
attract top talent. In short, a broad-based model, such as the
proposed BMI model, has the potential not so much to reduce
competition for top talent, but to make the allocation of resources
for such talent more acceptable and to create non-monetary
benefits for talented executives.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Corporations are not communities without a human element.
Corporations are institutions comprised of human beings, and
the issues that arise with any kind of human community also
The social existence of corporations,
arise in corporate life.
however, is dependent upon their successfully taking on the
responsibility of being economically efficient producers of goods
and services and organized practitioners of economizing values
that battle entropic disintegration. 260 Corporations are not only
that. They remain human institutions, but one must take into
account the special role that wealth production and property
values have in corporate responsibility.
Those institutions should provide a system of checks and
balances producing impartial treatment of (at least) internal
constituents, a commitment to the common good, and adaptive
openness to the outside community. 26 1 Doing this requires a
balancing of economizing, power-aggrandizing, and ecologizing
These values can be manifested through increasing
values.
recognition of property rights, fostering the creation of mediating
sub-units within the corporation, and by having those mediating
institutions regularly identify and discuss the moral norms of its
members. These steps would allow for the efficiency of markets
to discipline corporations while preserving the moral goods of
human lives in such corporations.

260. FREDERICK, supra note 213, at 30-43.
261. Id. at 144. Frederick refers to the goal of "homeostatic succession" and
notes that radical shifts diminish the supportive system of life's web. Id. at 14245. Of course, this is not to say that all changes must be smooth. There may be
some starts and stops in the evolutionary process. The point, however, remains
that radical change involves significant risk to the beings living in the midst of
such change and that the techno-symbolic ability of human beings can be used,
particularly in corporate life, to make those changes less rather than more painful.

